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BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
—•— ' ' ' 1 
The Defendant—Appellant appeals fro|m the judgment 
upon a jury verdict in a criminal action brought against him 
by the State of Utah for an alleged violation of 76-6-302 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, to-wit: aggravated 
robbery. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT? 
i . . . . . . i • i i 
The Defendant—Appellant was found gulilty by a jury 
and the Defendant was sentenced by the Court. The Defendant's 
challenges for cause and motion for a directed verdict v/ere 
denied by the Court. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Defendant—Appellant respectfully prays that the 
verdict be set aside and a verdict of not guillty entered or 
that a new trial be ordered. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The Defendant—Appellant, Keith S. Brooks, hereinafter 
referred to as the Defendant, was tried before the Honorable 
Thornley K. Swan, District Court Judge for the Second Judi-
cial District for Davis County, State of Utah, on the 25th 
day of November, 1975. The defendant was charged with the 
offense of aggravated robbery as set forth in 76-6-302, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
There were present in the Court 21 potential jurors 
of which 16 were called and seated. (Court Record, page 20) 
The 16 potential jury members were as follows: 
1. Mason Moore 
2. Glen C. Lewis 
3. Dan Lee 
4. Lawrence Byington 
5. R. F. Zeigler 
6. Carol Elder 
7. Steven R. Chapman 
8. Pam Ward 
9. Marshall E. Maxfield 
10. Jean Isler 
11. Frank Zamora 
12. James Mayfield 
13. Phil G. Greenwood 
14. Dorothy T. Bodily 
15. Thomas Creamer 
16. Dee Wayne Downs 
The Court began the questioning of the prospective 
jurors with the following results from the prospective juror, 
Mason Moore. 
Do any of you know Barry Godwin? 
Mr. Moore? 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR MASON MOORE: Hefs a neighbor, 
personal friend. I know his family. 
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THE COURT: And by "a neighbor" how close 
a neighbor? Next door or down the street? 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR MOORE: Dowh the street. 
THE COURT: Do you have a clo$e neighbor rela-
tionship with him, or would you sa^ a casual neighbor 
relationship? By "close" I would ask if he visits 
in your home and you visit in his home? 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR MOORE: Very infrequently, 
although we do meet in church activities occasionally. 
THE COURT: Member of the same ward? 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR MOORE: Yes. 
THE COURT: Do you have any ecclesiastical 
authority over him or he over you? 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR MOORE: None, whatsoever. 
THE COURT: So in that respect its a casual, 
more or less, relationship in the watrd. Would that 
be correct? 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR MOORE: Yes. 
(Partial Transcript, Page 2, Line 6, througlta. Page 3, Line 2; 
Transcript begins at page 57 of Court Record) 
MR. ECHARD: I'd like to have Mir. Moore asked 
if his, just the general relationship with Mr. God-
win would affect him in trying the cajse at all, 
under any circumstances; if he feels he can be a 
fair and impartial jury member knowing that he may 
be one of the key witnesses involved in the trial. 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR MOORE: It might - I might 
have some feelings, since I know Barry, that I'd 
like to see him receive whatever is due, or that 
justice was met. But I think the facts would have 
to answer that, and I would address myself to the 
facts. 
MR. ECHARD: I wonder if we could ask Mr. 
Moore, Your Honor, if he were sitting as a defendant 
in a trial, and a witness that was testifying in 
that trial against him had a friend sitting on the 
jury with the same state of mind that Mr. Moore has, 
if he, as a defendant, would feel comfprtable about 
that. 
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PROSPECTIVE JUROR MOORE: Probably not, but— 
MR* ECHARD: I would ask that Mr. Moore be 
excused, Your Honor. 
(P.T., P. 4, L. 22 through P. 5, L. 15) 
MR. ECHARD: Thank you, Your Honor, I have no 
further questions. I would, for the record, challenge 
Mr. Moore and Mrs. Ward, because of their close rela-
tionship with a witness. 
(P.T., P. 7, L. 1 through L. 4) 
THE COURT: The jury system, ladies and gentle-
men, was invested in an atmosphere and a situation 
so that parties could be tried by a jury of their 
peers. And in most communities the parties are 
known to the jurors and the jurors know something 
about the parties. I think it would be almost im-
possible, in some of our rural counties, to choose 
a jury who did not know witnesses and did not know 
the parties or something about the parties. Those 
acquaintanceships do not disqualify a person to serve 
as a juror in a case. Those relationships could, 
however, result in disqualification. But that would 
be if, because of those relationships, a juror would 
have difficulty setting those relationships aside and 
trying the facts of the case squarely on their merits 
and making a decision without bias or prejudice. 
Mr. Moore, do you feel that you can do that in 
this case? 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR MOORE: Yes. 
THE COURT: Mrs. Ward, do you feel that you can? 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR WARD: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Is there any juror who feels that 
he cannot do this? 
No hands are raised. 
The challenges are denied. 
MR. ECHARD: I believe Mr. Moore had a question, 
Your Honor, for the Court. 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR MOORE: The question I have 
is, you mentioned facts. And, of course, there's 
other than facts that enter into trials, and it 
would be difficult to say definitely if there were 
something that was in balance. 
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THE COURT: 
On the other hand, you are the sole triers of 
the facts, and that is your sole duty, to listen to 
the evidence and to determine what the facts are and 
to apply the law as the Court states it to you* 
Do you think you would have any difficulty in 
that regard, Mr. Moore? 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR MOORE: No. And I thank you 
for your clarification. 
THE COURT: Mrs. Ward? 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR WARD: No. 
THE COURT: Any other juror? 
No response. 
THE COURT: Do you pass the jurors for cause. 
MR. GUNNARSON: We so do, Your j^onor. 
THE COURT: And except as noted, do you? 
MR. ECHARD: Yes, Your Honor, except as noted. 
THE COURT: The Court will find that the jurors 
are qualified to serve in this case, and counsel may 
take their exceptions, or their challenges. 
(P.T., P. 7, L. 19, through P. 10, L. 17) 
The following questions were put to the prospective 
juror, Pam Ward: 
Do any of you know Steve Leishmah, who has been 
in uniform? 
Mrs. Ward? 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR PAM WARD: Yes., 
THE COURT: What is the nature of your acquaint-
anceship with Mr. Leishman? 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR WARD: He' s a very good friend 
of mine and my husband's. I work with his wife at 
the bank, -and my husbandfs known him for quite a few 
years. 
THE COURT: By "very good friend," do you visit 
in each other's homes? 
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PROSPECTIVE JUROR WARD: Yes. 
THE COURT: Frequently or occasionally? 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR WARD: Occasionally. 
THE COURT: Do you have any relationship other 
than the friendship and your business relationship? 
You say Mrs. Leishman works at the bank? 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR WARD: Yes. 
THE COURT: With you, regular? 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR WARD: Yes. 
THE COURT: And so you have a regular business 
relationship with her? 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR WARD: Uh huh. Yes. 
THE COURT: And your husbands are friendly, 
and you get together from time to time? 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR WARD: Uh huh. 
THE COURT: Anyone else know Mr. Leishman? 
No other hands are raised. 
(P.T., P. 3, L. 8, through P. 4, L. 10) 
I'd like to ask Mrs., I think it's Mrs. Pam Ward, 
I believe — 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR WARD: Yes. 
MR. ECHARD: I noticed prior to the trial that 
you were talking to one of the officers involved -
Mr. Leishman. 
I'd like to have her asked if that is a very 
close relationship, that might affect her determina-
tion if Mr. Leishman was a witness in the trial. 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR WARD: He's a very good friend, 
but of course I, you know, I know I would be fair. I 
would consider the facts. 
MR. ECHARD: If it came to a question about the 
accuracy of the, or the validity of the testimony of 
Mr. Leishman as compared to the testimony of another 
individual, Your Honor, I'd like to have her asked if 
that might affect her determination as a jury member. 
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PROSPECTIVE JUROR WARD: I don't think so. 
MR. ECHARD: I'd like to have Mrs. Ward asked 
if in her conversations with Mr. Leishman prior to 
the time she was empaneled, they discussed anything 
at all concerning the case or the circumstances sur-
rounding the case that's pending today. 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR WARD: No. 
(P.T., P. 6, L. 1, through L. 24) 
All jury members were asked during the questioning by 
the Court or by counsel if they had any physical disabilities 
that would prevent them from fairly hearing and deciding the 
case. None of the jury members responded indicating any such 
physical problems. However, it was learned at the time that 
the jury panel was polled that one of the individuals had an 
apparent problem with his hearing. 
Do you wish to have the jury polled? 
MR. ECHARD: Yes, Your Honor, I do. 
THE COURT: The law provides that either party 
may ask that the jury answer individually to the 
verdict, and so I will ask you and each of you this 
question: Was this and is this your verdict? Mr. 
Lewis? 
JUROR GLEN C. LEWIS: Will you state your 
question again, please? 
THE COURT: Was this and is this your verdict? 
JUROR LEWIS: I didn't understand it. Tell me 
again. I don't hear too good. 
THE COURT: Was this your verdict, and is it 
now your verdict? 
JUROR LEWIS: Yes. Yes, it's my verdict. 
THE COURT: Mr. Lee, was this and is this your 
verdict? 
JUROR DAN LEE: Yes, Your Honor. 
(P.T., P. 11, L. 11, through P. 12, L. 2) 
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The only evidence presented by the State that pointed 
to the Defendant's involvement consisted of the testimony of 
two eyewitnesses, Barry Godwin and Gary Charles Brown. Other 
witnesses were called by the State, but none of them were 
able to give any testimony other than background information 
concerning the interview of the two eyewitnesses and the 
arrest of the Defendant. 
BARRY GODWIN 
One of the eyewitnesses, Barry Godwin, within five 
minutes after the robbery of the Circle K Store, described 
the robber as being 51 9" in height with a short afro hair 
style, in his mid to late twenties, and clean shaven. 
(Transcript, Page 12, Line 7, through Line 27) The in-
vestigating officer, Steven Leishman, asked Mr. Godwin if 
the robber had any prominent hair features such as full bushy 
sideburns, beard, mustache, or extraordinary eyebrows. Mr. 
Godwin said that he appeared to be clean shaven. (T., P. 13, 
L. 1, through L. 9) Mr. Godwin was shown a group of photo-
graphs by Officer Leishman and picked out Exhibit C as the 
person who looked like the robber. 
Barry Godwin picked out the Defendant's photograph 
on June 22, 1975, one day after the robbery, but did not 
see the Defendant until October 3, 1975, the date of the 
preliminary hearing. (T., P. 74, L. 20, through L. 30) On 
October 3, 1975,-Mr. Godwin saw the Defendant prior to his 
testifying. (T., P. 48, L. 10, through L. 12) Mr. Godwin 
testified under oath at the preliminary hearing that he had 
told the officer at one time that the individual who robbed 
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him was 5' 6" and on another occasion that he was 5' 9". 
(T., P. 59, L. 3, through L. 12) Mr. Godwin testified at 
the preliminary hearing that the robber did not have a goatee, 
a mustache, or any sideburns. (T., P. 63, L. 1, through L. 10) 
At the trial held on November 25, 1975, Barry Godwin 
for the first time described the robber as being 61 1" in 
height. (T., P. 30, L. 17, through L. 24; T., P. 59, L. 10, 
through L. 15) He also testified that the robber had a 
medium afro hair style and was clean shaven. (T., P. 38, 
L. 23, through L. 28; T., P. 40, L. 4, through L. 8) Mr. 
Godwin Stated that the Defendant's appearance in Court was 
different than the appearance of the robber in that the 
Defendant had chin whiskers, a mustache, sideburns, and his 
hair was wavier. (T., P. 52, L. 22, through L. 27) 
GARY CHARLES BROWN 
The other eyewitness, Gary Charles B^own, a few days 
after the robbery, reported to the police that the robber 
was 5' 9", had a short afro-type hair style, a smaller than 
average nose, and was wearing a dark jacket with a cloth 
collar. (T., P. 104, L. 11, through L. 22) 
At the preliminary hearing Mr. Brown testified that 
he passed the robber as he entered the Circle K Store and 
that he was 6f 1/2" tall and that the robber was 51 9" tall. 
(T., P. 136, L. 17, through L. 29) Mr. Brown also stated 
that the robber had a normal black man's hair,, no long 
sideburns, no mustache, and no goatee or any bther type of 
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facial hair. (T., P. 139, L. 14, through L. 28) In des-
scribing the difference between the Defendant's appearance 
on the date of the preliminary hearing and that of the robber, 
Mr. Brown stated that the Defendant had hair on his lip 
which the robber did not have, the Defendant's hair style 
was different than that of the robber, and the Defendant's 
sideburns were different than that of the robber. (T., P. 141, 
L. 8, through P. 143, L. 2) 
At the trial on November 25, 1975, Mr. Brown stated 
for the first time that the robber was 6' tall, had a shadow 
of a mustache, wavy afro-type hair cut, sideburns, and a 
goatee. (T., P. 95, L. 4, through L. 7; T., P. 96, L. 21, 
through L. 26; T., P. 100, L. 22, through L. 25) 
Mr. Brown testified that a few days prior to his 
testimony in District Court the prosecuting attorney had 
placed Mr. Godwin and Mr. Brown on the stand in the District 
Court and went over their testimony in the presence of each 
other. (T., P. 116, L. 18, through L. 25; T., P. 120, L. 30, 
through P. 121, L. 2) This was the first time Mr. Brown had 
heard the testimony of Mr. Godwin and Mr. Brown testified 
that the meeting had a durastic effect upon the testimony 
he presented at trial. (T., P. 119, L. 26, through P. 120, 
L. 3) 
DEFENSE TESTIMONY 
The Defendant, Keith S. Brooks, testified in his own 
behalf and stated that he had been with his girlfriend, Leila 
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Betty Gavaros, on the 21st day of June. J&t 10:30 p.m. on 
that date, he purchased food at the Stimson1s Market in Ogden 
City from a Janice Hazel Sandburn who was operating a drive-
in window. The Defendant also testified that he had not been 
in Bountiful on that day and did not rob the Circle K Store. 
(T., P. 203, L. 28, through P. 204, L. 9) The State's wit-
nesses had testified that the robbery occurred at approximately 
10:20 p.m. on the 21st day of June, 1975, in Bountiful City. 
The Defendant's girlfriend, Leila Betty Gavaros, 
testified that on the 21st day of June, 1975, she was with 
the Defendant the entire day and that he had only been out 
of her presence for approixmately 20 minutes when he went 
to Stimson's Market to purchase food. Prior to that time 
the two of them had been at Pine View Dam in Weber County, 
State of Utah. (T., P. 167, L. 16, through P. 172, L. 6) 
Two other witnesses called for the defense testified that 
they had seen Keith S. Brooks and Leila Betty Gavaros at 
Pine View Dam on the 21st day of June, 1975. (T., P. 187, 
L. 6, through L. 9; T., P. 194, L. 2, through L. 17) 
A Mrs. Janice Hazel Sandburn testified that she 
worked at Stimsons Market in Ogden City on t^ he 21st day of 
June, 197 5, and that she waited on the Defenjdant, Keith S. 
Brooks, at a drive-in window at 10:30 p.m. on that date. 
Mrs. Sandburn remembers Keith S. Brooks because he had his 
hair in pink curlers. (T., P. 251, L. 1, through L. 28) 
Mrs. Sandburn was very definite about the time 
because of circumstances involving her employment. (T., P. 253, 
L. 2, through L. 16) 
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Both Leila Betty Gavaros and the Defendant's father, 
Ralph Brooks, testified that on June 21, 197 5, the Defendant's 
hair style was exactly the same as that shown in Plaintiff's 
Exhibits G and H. (T., P. 175, L. 4, through L. 16; T. , P. 
267, L. 11, through L. 30) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DEFENDANT HAS BEEN DENIED A TRIAL BY AN IMPARTIAL 
JURY AS GUARANTEED BY ARTICLE I, SECTION 12, OF THE CONSTI-
TUTION OF UTAH AND THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO 
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION. 
It is the contention of the Defendant—Appellant, 
hereinafter referred to as the Defendant, that he has been 
denied a trial by an impartial jury. This allegation is 
based upon the fact that the trial court refused to remove 
two jury members when challenged for cause. As set forth 
in the Statement of Facts, the prospective juror, Moore, 
stated that the chief eyewitness against the Defendant, 
Barry Godwin, was a neighbor and a personal friend. Mr. 
Moore and Mr. Godwin were members of the same ward of the 
LDS Church. Mr. Moore stated that his acquaintanceship 
with Mr. Godwin might affect his ability to be a fair and 
impartial jury member and that he would like to see Mr. 
Godwin receive whatever is due to him or that justice was 
met. After extensive instructions and questioning by the 
Court as to whether or not Mr. Moore could decide the case 
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from the facts and the law as presented by the Court, Mr. 
Moore voluntarily stated, "The question I, have is, you men-
tioned facts. And, of course, there's other than facts that 
enter into trials, and it would be difficult to say defi-
nitely if there was something that was in balance." 
The Defendant contends that the te$t that needs to 
be applied to determine if a juror member is impartial is 
not whether he can apply the law as instructed by the Court, 
but rather whether the jury member can give the same impar-
tial consideration to the testimony of all witnesses appearing 
before the Court. Mr. Moore was right when he -indicated that 
there are other than facts that enter into trials and that 
it would be difficult for him to set as a jtiry member if 
testimony had to be balanced. Mr. Moore also indicated that 
he would not feel comfortable if he were the Defendant in 
the trial and one of the witnesses against had a friend 
on the jury with the same state of mind as 1;hat held by 
Mr. Moore. 
The prospective juror, Pam Ward, stat|ed that she 
was a "very good friend" of Steve Leishman. Steve Leishman 
was one of the chief investigating officers of the robbery 
and was involved in the early stages of the investigation. 
Officer Leishman took statements from the witnesses, ob-
tained an identification of the Defendant frojm the witnesses, 
and arrested the^Defendant. The prospective juror, Ward, 
stated that she and her husband visited occasionally with 
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Officer Leishman and his family. In addition, Mrs. Ward 
had a business relationship with the wife of Officer 
Leishman at the bank at which they were employed. Mrs. 
Ward also testified that she had been having a conversation 
with Officer Leishman prior to the trial. When asked if her 
friendship would effect her ability to be a juror if the 
accuracy of the testimony of Mr. Leishman was challenged, 
Mrs. Ward testified "I don't think so." 
The friendship of the prospective jurors with the 
State's witnesses is of vital importance in the trial of 
the Defendant since the only evidence of the Defendant's 
guilt was the identification of two eyewitnesses whose tes-
timony was highly inconsistent. Consequently, the main issue 
in the trial was whether or not the jury believed the eye-
witness' testimony in spite of the inconsistencies and in 
comparison with the testimony presented by the Defendant and 
witnesses testifying on his behalf. The Court could have 
easily replaced the two challenged jurors since it had five 
additional jurors which could have been drawn upon. 
The Defendant relies upon this Court's decision in 
the case of Crawford vs. Manning, 542 P.2d 1091 (UT 1975). 
That case involved a civil trial but the reasoning used by 
the Court would seem to be more compelling in a criminal 
case where an unanimous decision is required. The Court 
in its unanimous, decision stated: 
One doubts that a person who harbors strong 
feelings concernig anyone v/ho would sue to re-
cover money for the death of another could be a 
fair and impartial juror. She should have been 
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excused peremptorily and one of th^ eight surplus 
jurors placed in the box. 
It is no excuse to say that the verdict was 
unanimous and since six of the eight jurors could 
find a verdict, the error was harmless. By exer-
cising one of their peremptory challenges upon 
this prospective juror, plaintiffs had only two 
remaining* The juror which remained because the 
plaintiffs had no challenges to remove him may have 
been a hawk amid seven doves and imposed his will 
upon them. 
A party is entitled to exercise his three 
peremptory challenges upon impartiajl prospective 
jurors, and he should not be compelled to waste 
one in order to accomplish that which the trial 
judge should have done. 
The prospective juror in the Crawfotd case ultimately 
stated that she could render a verdict free of bias and pre-
judice. The same conclusion was reached by the prospective 
jurors, Moore and Ward, in this case. However, it is ob-
vious that Mr. Moore had difficulty in deciding whether or 
not he could be an impartial juror. Likewise it seems 
obvious that a person who had a close relationship such as 
the one between Mrs. Ward and Officer Leishntian would be 
affected by that relationship in determining the weight 
to be given to the testimony presented by tt^ e parties. 
It is the contention of the Defendant that the Court's 
refusal to remove Mr. Moore and Mrs. Ward upon challenge 
prevented the Defendant from having four per^mptive 
challenges upon impartial prospective jurors. Consequently, 
the Court's action constituted prejudicial error and a denial 
of the Defendant's constitutional right to ar^  impartial jury. 
After a jury verdict had been rendered^ the Defendant 
requested that the jury be polled. Judge Swai}i polling the 
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jury discovered that the juror, Glen C. Lewis, had diffi-* 
culty with his hearing. Judge Swan had to ask Mr. Lewis 
three times if the verdict handed to the bailiff was his 
verdict. In the process, Mr. Lewis stated, "I don't under-
stand it. Tell me again. I don't hear too good." This 
was the first time that the Court or the attorneys repre-
senting the parties were aware that Mr. Lewis had a hearing 
problem. If the jury member could not understand Judge Swan 
without repeating his question three times, he must have 
missed a substantial part of the testimony presented in a 
two-day trial. 
A similiar situation existed in the case of Common-
wealth vs. Brown, 332 A.2d 838 (Penn. 1974). In this case 
the Court learned while it was polling the jury that one 
of the jury members had a hearing problem. In granting a 
new trial, the Court stated: 
The Appellant is entitled to a jury trial 
arrived at by each and all of the jurors upon 
the evidence introduced. 
* * * 
The presence of a juror with a physical 
impairment of such magnitude as to interfere with 
a juror's ability to hear and understand the pre-
sented testimony and evidence precludes a verdict 
by all the jurors. Such a disability would render 
the jury incompetent to serve and would deny Appel-
lant's right to an impartial jury trial and a fair 
hearing. 
* * * 
We recognize that it is quite difficult to deter-
mine the amount of prejudice suffered by the 
Appellant because of the jurors hearing difficulties. 
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However, the records substantiates that the juror 
had difficulty in hearing- He admitted inability 
to hear questions and his response^ were incon-
clusive as to whether or not he he&rd all of the 
testimony. Thus we are confronted with a situation 
where in order to assure fairness and to alleviate 
any possibility of prejudice caused by the deaf 
juror, we just assume prejudice foi} the sake of 
insured fairness. 
* * * 
The Defendant contends that the heading difficulties 
of Glen C, Lewis rendered him incompetent to enter a know-
ledgable verdict and thereby deprived the Defendant of an 
impartial jury trial and a fair hearing. 
POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AGAINST THE DEFENDANT BY THE 
STATE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO PROVE THE DEFENDANT'S GUILT 
BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT AND, CONSEQUENTLY, THE DEFENDANT 
SHOULD HAVE BEEN FOUND NOT GUILTY AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
This Court has held that a jury verdict against a 
defendant may be set aside when it appears that the evidence 
was so inconclusive or unsatisfactory that reasonable minds 
fairly acting upon it must have entertained reasonable 
doubt that the defendant committed the crime. (State vs. 
Sullivan, 307 P.2d 212; State vs. Danks 350 p.2d 146) It 
is the contention of the Defendant that the evidence pre-
sented before the jury was not sufficient to establish 
beyond a reasonable doubt the Defendant's gui|lt. 
The only evidence presented at the tri^ il connecting 
the Defendant with the robbery of the Circle C^ Store on 
June 21, 1975, was the testimony of two eyewitnesses. These 
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eyewitnesses picked out a photograph which is marked as 
Plaintiff's Exhibit C. That photograph was one taken of 
the Defendant, Keith S. Brooks, in October of 1971 (see 
date on photograph marked Exhibit C). Neither of the eye-
witnesses were asked to identify the Defendant in a line-up 
or saw the Defendant at any time prior to October 3, 1975. 
The witnesses, therefore, did not see the individual they 
identified as being the robber for approximately three ro: 
and one-half months from the date of the robbery. 
When the witnesses were first interviewed by the 
investigating officers, both of them stated that the robber 
was clean shaven and had no facial hair. Barry Godwin 
reported to the police officers that the robber was 51 6" 
or 5' 8" tall. Gary Brown testified that the robber was 
51 9" tall. Three and one-half months later at the pre-
liminary hearing, both witnesses again testified that the 
robber was clean shaven, without facial hair, and that he 
was from 5' 6" to 5f 9" in height. It was not until the 
trial on November 25, 1975, that either witness ever claimed 
that the robber was 61 or 61 1" in height. 
In fact, the Defendant is 6' tall, has bush side-
burns to the bottom of his jaw, a mustache, and a goatee. 
Plaintiff's Exhibits G and H show the appearance of the 
Defendant when he was arrested on June 25, 1975, four days 
after the robbery. (see dates on front of exhibits) 
At the trial Barry Godwin still maintained that the 
robber was clean shaven and testified that the Defendant as 
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he appeared at the time of the trial was different than the 
robber in that he had chin whiskers, a mu|stache, sideburns 
and wavier hair. The witness, Gary Brown, testified at 
the trial that the robber had a shadow of a mustache, wavy 
afro-type hair, sideburns, and a goatee. This testimony 
v/as given by Gary Brown in spite of the fact that he had 
testified under oath at the preliminary hdaring that the 
robber had none of these features and had told the police 
officer immediately after the robbery that the robber was 
clean shaven. 
Mr. Brown also testified at the trial that he had 
gone over his testimony with the prosecuting attorney in 
the presence of Mr. Godwin two days earlier and that the 
meeting had a "durastic affect" upon his testimony. 
It is the contention of the Defendant that his 
appearance on June 21, 1975, is established beyond doubt 
by Exhibits G and H, which were taken four days later. 
Additional witnesses were also called to establish that 
the Defendant's appearance was the same on the 21st of June 
as it was on the 25th od June, 1975. Consequently, the 
conclusion is inescapable that the witnesses did not 
witness the Defendant rob the Circle K Storey 
The Defendant contends that the testimony of the 
State's witnesses was not sufficient to provd beyond a 
reasonable doubt_the Defendant's guilt. In fact, their 
testimony proves that the Defendant could not have been the 
individual that robbed the Circle K Store. 
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In addition to the discrepancies in the State's case, 
the Defendant presented testimony from his girlfriend, Leila 
Betty Gavaros, and from Janice Sandburn that he was in Ogden 
City at 10:30 p.m. on June 21, 1975. That would be approxi-
mately 10 minutes after the robbery occurred in Bountiful, 
Utah. Janice Sandburn was a white woman who had not known 
the Defendant prior to June 21, 1975 and, consequently, had 
no reason to be other than impartial in her testimony. 
It is the position of the Defendant that the State 
did not prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt and that 
the evidence was so inconclusive and unsatisfactory that 
reasonable minds must have a reasonable doubt. Consequently, 
the Defendant respectfully requests the Court to reverse 
the verdict of the trial court and find the Defendant not 
guilty. 
SUMMARY 
The Defendant contends that he has been denied a 
fair and impartial jury trial as provided for by the State 
and Federal Constitutions. This contention is based upon 
the fact that two of the prospective witnesses were friends 
of witnesses called on behalf of the State and were not 
capable of giving a fair and impartial consideration to the 
evidence presented before the Court. Therefore, the Court 
committed prejudicial error in failing to remove said jurors 
when challenged by the defense. In addition, one of the 
jurors who did sit on the case was unable to hear sufficiently 
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well enough to comprehend the testimony and its importance 
thereby disproving the Defendant of a tr^al by eight impar-
tial jury members. 
The evidence presented by the State v/as not sufficient 
to prove the Defendant's ^ guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and, 
in fact, established that the Defendant was not the indivi-
dual that robbed the Circle K Store. Therefore, the Defendant 
respectfully prays for the Court to reverse the guilty verdict 
and find the Defendant not guilty or in the alternative to 
refer the case back to the trial Court for a new trial. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
PATTERSON, PHILLIPS, GRIDLEY & ECHARD 
By 
Robert A. Echard 
Attorney for Defendant—Appellant 
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